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META-ANALYSES OF POST-ACQUISITION
PERFORMANCE: INDICATIONS OF
UNIDENTIFIED MODERATORS
DAVID R. KING,1* DAN R. DALTON,2 CATHERINE M. DAILY2 and
JEFFREY G. COVIN2
1 Air Force Pentagon (SAF/AQP), Arlington, Virginia, U.S.A.
2 Kelley School of Business, Department of Management, Indiana University,
Bloomington, Indiana, U.S.A.
Empirical research has not consistently identified antecedents for predicting post-acquisition
performance. We employ meta-analytic techniques to empirically assess the impact of the most
commonly researched antecedent variables on post-acquisition performance. We find robust
results indicating that, on average and across the most commonly studied variables, acquiring
firms’ performance does not positively change as a function of their acquisition activity, and is
negatively affected to a modest extent. More importantly, our results indicate that unidentified
variables may explain significant variance in post-acquisition performance, suggesting the need
for additional theory development and changes to M&A research methods. Copyright  2003
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Since the last meta-analytic review of merger
and acquisition1 (M&A) performance (Datta,
Narayanan, and Pinches, 1992), trillions of dol-
lars have been spent in the acquisition of tens
of thousands of firms (Gupta and Gerchak, 2002)
and dozens of studies examining post-acquisition
performance have been published. Unfortunately,
research does not uniformly support managers’
apparent enthusiasm for the practice, with the
impact of acquisitions on acquiring firm per-
formance remaining ‘inconclusive’ (e.g., Haspes-
lagh and Jemison, 1991; Roll, 1988; Sirower,
1997). Further, existing empirical research on post-
acquisition performance has not consistently iden-
tified antecedents that can be used to predict
post-acquisition performance (Hitt et al., 1998;
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1 Empirical research has used the terms merger and acquisition
interchangeably; we adopt this same convention.
Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel, 1994; Sirower,
1997). The goal of the current study is to cumu-
late the findings of published research on post-
acquisition performance and to identify promising
directions for further M&A research.
Our study makes multiple contributions beyond
Datta et al. (1992). First, our study more than
doubles (93 vs. 41) the number of published stud-
ies analyzed. Our meta-analyses are based on a
larger sample of studies, allowing better estima-
tion of the population value for the relationships
between commonly studied M&A antecedent vari-
ables. Second, the increase in the number of stud-
ies in our meta-analyses also allows examination
of the impact of an additional variable, acquisi-
tion experience, on post-acquisition performance.
Third, our study is the first to cumulate research
findings for both stock and accounting measures
of post-acquisition performance. The Datta et al.
(1992) study does not include accounting measures
of performance. Although the majority of existing
post-acquisition performance research uses stock
market-based measures of performance (Bild,
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1998; Sirower, 1997), the use of multiple mea-
sures has consistently been encouraged (Hoskisson
and Hitt, 1990; Lubatkin, 1983) to facilitate cumu-
lating research across disciplines (Ramanujam and
Varadarajan, 1989) and to improve the understand-
ing of differences between accounting and stock
market measures (Hoskisson et al., 1993). Fourth,
we use multiple event windows in our meta-
analyses to detect whether the impact of acquir-
ing another firm impacts post-acquisition perfor-
mance differently, while Datta et al. (1992) do not
differentiate between the event windows of stud-
ies included in their analysis. Fifth, our results
based on a larger sample (1790 to 29,050 vs.
409 observations) conflict with the finding that
method of payment impacts post-acquisition per-
formance (Datta et al., 1992) and contradicts the-
ory from finance (e.g., Travlos, 1987) that method
of payment helps predict post-acquisition perfor-
mance. Finally, our use of up-to-date meta-analytic
methods facilitates the identification of moderating
effects, a significant contribution of our study.
Our results indicate that post-acquisition per-
formance is moderated by variables unspecified
in existing research. Meanwhile, the impact of
four variables commonly examined in existing
literature was not significant in explaining vari-
ance in post-acquisition performance. Thus, exist-
ing empirical M&A research has not clearly and
repeatedly identified those variables that impact
an acquiring firm’s subsequent performance. An
implication of the preceding major finding—i.e.,
that no post-acquisition performance effect exists
for antecedent variables that have been repeatedly
studied—is that changes to both M&A theory and
research methods may be needed.
From a methodological standpoint, there is little
overlap in the variables (approximately one-third)
used by researchers to explain post-acquisition
performance. ‘New’ effects are characteristically
sought over replication of known effects, so knowl-
edge accumulation has been slower than might be
expected given the high level of research activity
in the M&A area. Importantly, because research
variables of demonstrated importance are regu-
larly excluded from M&A studies, underspecifica-
tion of research models that can bias conclusions
(see Griffiths, Hill, and Judge, 1993) may be the
norm in M&A research. Future M&A researchers
would be well advised to use variables from exist-
ing M&A research as a foundation to build new
models of post-acquisition performance.
An additional methodological consideration is
that a potentially rich area for pursuing future
M&A research is to examine the impact of
interactions on post-acquisition performance (Hitt
et al., 1998; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). Several
recent studies from strategy serve as exemplars
of M&A research that examine interactions in
post-acquisition performance (e.g., Banaszak-Holl
et al., 2002; Capron, 1999; Hitt et al., 1996;
Hoskisson et al., 1993; Krishnan, Miller, and
Judge, 1997). Unfortunately, the studies do not
exist in large enough numbers to allow cumulating
their results using meta-analysis, indicating that
additional theory development and empirical
research on M&A activity is needed.
The theoretical implications of our findings
are also important. The most common theoreti-
cal rationale for M&A activity is the search for
synergy, or the concept that the sum of merging
two firms is greater than their individual parts (i.e.,
2 + 2 = 5). Research has identified a need to iden-
tify factors leading to synergy creation in acquisi-
tions (Capron, Dussauge, and Mitchell, 1998; Hitt
et al., 1998). Synergy, as suggested by Sirower
(1997), however, may be too nebulous a con-
cept to be the core element in models purporting
to explain post-acquisition performance. Improve-
ments in model validity may be possible if M&A
theorists instead embrace such concepts as parent-
ing advantage (Campbell, Goold, and Alexander,
1995), complementary resources (Harrison et al.,
2001), or absorptive capacity (Zahra and George,
2002) as core to their models. These latter con-
cepts may better focus research attention toward
those tangible effects and variables that must be
operating or aligned in order for synergy to be
realized. In short, the high level of conceptual
abstraction introduced by building post-acquisition
performance research models around the concept
of synergy, rather than its more specific deter-
minants, may have contributed to the difficulty
researchers have experienced in creating models
that garner empirical support.
CUMULATING POST-ACQUISITION
PERFORMANCE RESEARCH
Post-acquisition performance research has com-
monly examined the impact of four vari-
ables: whether or not the acquisition was
by a conglomerate firm (e.g., Agrawal, Jaffe,
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and Mandelker, 1992; Berger and Ofek, 1995;
Lubatkin, 1987), whether or not the acquisition
was of a related firm (e.g., Hayward and Hambrick,
1997; Lubatkin, Srinivasan, and Merchant, 1997;
Walker, 2000; Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1983),
the method of payment (i.e., cash or equity) used
for the acquisition (e.g., Franks, Harris, and Mayer,
1988; Travlos, 1987; Walker, 2000), and whether
or not the acquiring firm had prior acquisition
experience (e.g., Franks, Harris, and Titman, 1991;
Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002;
Kroll et al., 1997). Additional factors may impact
post-acquisition performance; however, they have
not been examined in sufficient numbers to be con-
sidered in the present meta-analyses.2
Conglomerate firms
Conglomerate firms are commonly defined in the
strategic management literature as those exhibit-
ing significant unrelated product-market diversi-
fication (Rumelt, 1974). A broader definition of
conglomerates is adopted in the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) database (covering the years
1948 through 1979) on M&A activity that is
employed in much of the extant research on the
effects of conglomerate diversification on post-
acquisition performance. Conglomerate mergers,
as defined by the FTC, involve the acquisition of
completely unrelated companies, companies in dif-
ferent geographic markets, or companies whose
products do not directly compete with those of
the acquiring firm. However, empirical evidence
on the impact of diversification on post-acquisition
performance is contradictory, with research sug-
gesting that some firms benefit from the diversi-
fication but that, on average, most firms do not
(Loughran and Vijh, 1997). The present research
cumulates the following, conflicting findings on
the impact of diversification.
On one hand, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987)
note that the 13 most acquisitive conglomerate
firms, accounting for 16 percent of all FTC-
recorded M&A activity, experienced returns 3.6
2 Empirical research has explored the effects of literally dozens
of independent variables on post-acquisition performance. We
limit our review, however, to those variables revealed by our
meta-analyses to be common to three or more studies in which
the same ‘performance’ variable was examined (Dalton et al.,
2003). As such, we only review variables that we know can be
tested based on the known existence of a critical mass of relevant
empirical studies.
times greater than the S&P500 between 1965 and
1968, and 2.7 times greater than the S&P500
between 1965 and 1983. Additionally, Campa and
Kedia (2002) conclude that, for firms that pur-
sue it, diversification is a value-enhancing strategy.
A positive impact on performance in conglomer-
ate firms is suggested since they are more likely
to possess a business integration competence that
allows them to create rather than simply acquire
value through M&A activity (Salter and Weinhold,
1978). The assumed presence of what might be
termed a ‘conglomerate effect’ on post-acquisition
performance has led to several studies in this area
(e.g., Agrawal et al., 1992; Lubatkin, 1987).
On the other hand, several studies indicate that
a ‘diversification discount’ exists (Agrawal et al.,
1992; Anand and Singh 1997; Berger and Ofek,
1995; Lang and Stulz 1994). For example, Berger
and Ofek (1995) compare the value of the entire
diversified firm to the sum of its segments, and
conclude that diversified firms have 13–15 percent
less value than the sum of their segments would
have independently. An example of the logic that
suggests the stock performance of conglomerate
firms is discounted is that, since they aggregate
their financial performance from several divisions,
there is more uncertainty in predicting their cash
flows.
Related acquisitions
The relatedness of acquired firms to their acquirers
(where relatedness is defined in terms of resource
or product-market similarity) is often assumed to
impact the post-acquisition performance of the
acquiring firms. Specifically, the preponderance
of M&A literature suggests that acquiring related
firms leads to increased post-acquisition perfor-
mance (e.g., Capon et al., 1988; Kusewitt, 1985;
Palich, Cardinal, and Miller, 2000; Rumelt, 1974,
1982). Business relatedness is said to enable the
acquiring firm’s managers to effectively employ
their ‘dominant logic,’ or common conceptualiza-
tion of the success requirements in an acquired
business (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). Industry
familiarity can eliminate or significantly diminish
the need for acquiring firm managers to ‘learn’
the business of the acquired firm, and facilitate
learning from the acquisition process per se (Hitt,
Harrison, and Ireland, 2001).
In the context of acquisitions that require sig-
nificant managerial involvement, familiarity with
Copyright  2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 25: 187–200 (2004)
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the acquired firm’s market is often key to the suc-
cessful post-acquisition integration of the acquired
business (Roberts and Berry, 1985). Moreover,
related acquisitions can enable the acquiring firm’s
pre-existing resources to be productively lever-
aged in new businesses where those resources are
more likely to be valued and relevant. These argu-
ments are not meant to suggest, of course, that
related acquisitions are without risk. As observed
by Bergh (1997), acquisition relatedness may sim-
ply reduce the financial risk inherent to acquisi-
tions. The present research cumulates the findings
of the acquired firm relatedness on acquiring firm
performance.
Method of payment
There are two fundamental methods by which an
acquiring firm can pay for an acquisition: cash
and stock shares (equity). Research from finance
suggests that an acquiring firm’s managers will
seek to finance an acquisition in the most profitable
way (Travlos, 1987). Specifically, managers will
finance an acquisition with cash if they believe
their firm’s stock is undervalued, and with equity
(i.e., shares of stock) if they believe their firm’s
stock is overvalued. Therefore, the use of cash
as the acquisition medium may signal manager
expectations that post-acquisition performance will
be particularly strong.
The method of payment also affects the method
of accounting for an acquisition, which has impli-
cations for post-acquisition performance. Histori-
cally, there have been two methods of accounting
for an acquisition: the pooling of interests method
and the purchase method.3 Pooling of interests is
primarily used when an acquired firm is acquired
using stock as payment (Ravenscraft and Scherer,
1987). Pooling of interest accounting is associated
with higher acquisition premiums (Ravenscraft and
Scherer, 1987), and premiums paid for acquired
firms have been shown to negatively impact post-
acquisition performance (Hayward and Hambrick,
1997; Sirower, 1997). Still, a direct relationship
between method of payment and post-acquisition
performance remains to be demonstrated (Hayward
and Hambrick, 1997), and cumulating results from
3 The Financial Accounting Standards Board eliminated pooling
of interests accounting and modified recording of goodwill with
purchase accounting for all acquisitions completed after July 1,
2001 (Weil, 2001). For an explanation of the different methods
of accounting for a merger see Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987).
existing research may demonstrate whether such a
relationship exists.
Acquisition experience
Acquisitions create complex organizational chal-
lenges, and both individual and organizational
experience may be required to avoid integration
problems (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). For
example, at the individual level, lack of acqui-
sition experience may make a CEO particularly
susceptible to escalation of commitment that can
lead to the completion of deals at unreasonably
high costs (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Addi-
tionally, experience from past acquisitions may
build facilitating processes for the identification
(Hitt et al., 1998) and integration of acquired firm
resources, which may be required to improve post-
acquisition performance.
However, consistent findings on the relation-
ship between acquisition experience and post-
acquisition performance do not exist. Prior acquisi-
tion experience has been found to predict success
in later acquisitions (Bruton, Oviatt, and White,
1994; Fowler and Schmidt, 1989), to predict a
decline in performance as the number of acqui-
sitions increase (Kusewitt, 1985), and to have no
impact on acquisition performance (Lahey and
Conn, 1990). Still, Hitt et al. (2001: 55) caution
that ‘the importance of the link between manage-
rial experience and M&A success should not be
underestimated’ and we cumulate research findings
on acquisition experience.
METHOD
Sample
We employed multiple search techniques to iden-
tify empirical research that included M&A activ-
ity and financial performance. Whether a given
indicator of such activity or performance was an
independent, dependent, or a control variable was
unimportant. These variables need not have been
the main focus of a given study to be included
in the meta-analyses. It was only necessary that a
simple correlation (r) between these variables be
available in the article or derivable from it (see,
for example, Lipsey and Wilson, 2001; Rosen-
berg, Adams, and Gurevitch, 2000 for conversion
protocols).
Copyright  2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 25: 187–200 (2004)
Meta-analyses of Post-acquisition Performance 191
By a combination of computer-aided, key word
searches and manual searches of certain perti-
nent journals in accounting, finance, economics,
and management (e.g., Academy of Manage-
ment Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly,
Applied Financial Economics, Financial Manage-
ment, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal
of Business, Journal of Business Finance and
Accounting, Journal of Finance, Journal of Finan-
cial Economics, Journal of Financial Research,
Journal of Management, Organization Science, and
Strategic Management Journal ), we obtained a
subset of potentially applicable research reports.
We followed the ‘ancestry’ approach of article
identification (e.g., Cooper, 1998). By working
carefully from the more contemporary references,
tracking the references on which the articles relied,
and iteratively continuing this process, it is possi-
ble to determine a set of common early references
with no published predecessors. Relevant, pub-
lished empirical studies were identified beginning
in 1921 and continuing through September 2002.
The search process yielded 93 empirical stud-
ies with 852 effect sizes (i.e., germane bivariate
correlations) with a combined n size of 206,910.4
This n size is derived from adding the number
of companies on which each of the 93 studies
relied. For the meta-analyses and moderating anal-
yses that follow, the n size is a necessary ele-
ment by which significance distributions are cal-
culated. The relatively large sample-to-study ratio
results from research commonly relying on mul-
tiple operationalizations of financial performance
(e.g., abnormal returns with multiple event win-
dows, return on assets (ROA), return on equity
4 The list of studies included in our meta-analyses is available
from the authors upon request. Published research examining
M&A activity over 74 years is included in our meta-analyses.
A potential concern is whether results differ over time. The
separation of M&A research by time period is difficult because
a typical M&A study relies on many years of data (in our case,
for example, among the longer periods were 1962–79, 1970–90,
1980–92). The challenge in performing subsample analysis,
then, is to find studies with independent time periods, relying
on the same dependent variable and the same event window.
There was one opportunity where our data met those criteria: the
abnormal returns for acquiring firms with the Days 1–5 event
window. We separated these data into pre-1980 and post-1980
periods and the estimated r for the pre-1980 period was 0.073,
while r for the post-1980 period was 0.069. The difference in
R2 for these two estimates is only 0.0005. As such, it appears
that the difference in time frame is inconsequential. This result
is consistent with prior research that has consistently shown,
over time, that the average abnormal return of acquiring firms is
around zero (e.g., Datta et al., 1992; Ravenscraft and Scherer;
1987).
(ROE), return on sales (ROS)). It is important
to note that the variables on which we rely for
our analyses do not reflect our preferences, but
rather those variables appearing in extant empirical
research.
Meta-analytic procedure(s)
The meta-analyses were conducted consistent with
guidelines provided by Hunter and Schmidt (1990;
see also, Hunter and Schmidt, 1994). Meta-analysis
is a statistical research synthesis technique that,
while correcting for various statistical artifacts,
allows for the aggregation of results across sep-
arate studies to obtain an estimate of the true
relationship between two variables in the popu-
lation. Observed zero-order correlations between
the variables of interest are weighted by the sam-
ple size of the study in order to calculate the mean
weighted correlation (r) across all of the studies
involved in the analysis. The standard deviation
of the observed correlations is then calculated to
estimate their variability. Total variability across
studies is comprised of the true population varia-
tion, variation due to sampling error, and variation
due to other artifacts (i.e., reliability and range
restriction). Control of these artifacts provides a
more accurate estimate of the true variability.
To control for such artifacts, we relied on
Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (Borenstein, 1997),
a software package that employs Hunter and
Schmidt’s (1990) artifact distribution formulae.
While other meta-analyses in strategic manage-
ment (e.g., Boyd, 1991; Capon, Farley, and
Hoenig, 1990; Rhoades, Rechner, and Sundara-
murthy, 2000; Schwenk and Shrader, 1993) have
treated observed (i.e., not latent) variables as if
they were without error (i.e., reliability of 1.0), we
have opted for a more conservative 0.80 reliability
estimate (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998, 1999).5
5 We do not mean to appear critical about others’ choice of
reliability level (use of a reliability value less than one is merely
more conservative). In the entire database (852 effect sizes)
on which we relied for this meta-analysis, the independent and
financial performance variables were treated as observed in every
case. It is apparent that the empirical work in this area relies on
independent and performance variables as observed, and error
free. Lowering the reliability level, however, is conservative and
helps address concerns about the potential existence and impact
of subsamples on our analyses.
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RESULTS
Table 1 provides the results of separate meta-
analyses on each row for specific variables re-
flected in the literature on M&A activity and finan-
cial performance.6 To illustrate these results in
a traditional meta-analytical data presentation, it
would be necessary to create a multi-page inven-
tory. Instead, we have constructed a meta-analytic
corrected r matrix (Table 1) (Dalton et al., 2003).
The cell entries are meta-analytic corrected r pop-
ulation estimates. Consider the first row entry in
Table 1: for acquired firms at the time their acqui-
sition is announced (Day 0), the best estimate
of the actual population correlation for abnormal
(stock) returns is 0.70. The number of studies
relied on for this calculation is 33, reflecting a total
sample size of 5060. A subsequent section dis-
cusses a primary contribution of the present paper:
evidence of potential moderating variable(s).
Notice that Table 1 includes only one event win-
dow entry for ‘acquired firms,’ sometimes referred
to as ‘target’ firms, this at Day 0, or the day of the
merger announcement. Additional event windows
are not included for acquired firms, because at
some point after a merger announcement acquired
firms no longer exist independently. The balance of
6 The performance variables noted in Table 1 reflect those on
which the germane studies rely. There are other indicators of
financial performance on which M&A researchers have relied
(e.g., cash flow/sales, income growth, profitability, Jensen’s
alpha, sales growth, Tobin’s Q). None of these reach the min-
imum number of samples (3) to be included in the table (see
Dalton et al., 2003).
Table 1 illustrates the performance of the acquiring
firm over several event windows. Only at Day 0 are
the abnormal returns for acquiring firms positive
(r = 0.09) and significant. Notably, the difference
between Day 0 abnormal returns for acquired firms
and acquiring firms is substantial, as reflected in
the population r estimates of 0.70 vs. 0.09.
The remaining entries in Table 1 illustrate the
performance estimates of acquiring firms over a
series of event windows (Days 1–5, Days 6–21,
Days 22–180, Days 181 to 3 years, and greater
than 3 years). As shown, after the Days 1–5
event window, all of the ‘abnormal returns’ results
for the acquiring firms are negative. Table 1 also
includes results for an acquiring firm’s ROA, ROE,
and ROS performance; all of these results are
either insignificant or negative. Collectively, these
results imply that anticipated acquisition synergies
are not realized by acquiring firms.7 That is, M&A
activity does not create superior post-acquisition
performance for acquiring firms and is consistent
with the non-value-maximizing arguments often
7 The data on which we rely for the results illustrated in Table 1
are largely comprised of U.S. firms. There are, however, some
exceptions. Accordingly, we analyzed these data in two ways.
The results reported in Table 1 are the results for our entire
sample. We also separately tested these data while excluding
the international data. With one exception, the differences are
not consequential. For acquired firms’ abnormal returns at day
0, the estimated population r increased from 0.70 to 0.76. For
acquiring firms across all event windows, the differences are of
no practical significance (day 0, no change; days 1–5, no change;
days 6–21, no change; days 22–180, no change; greater than
180 days to 3 years, changed from −0.10 to −0.11; greater than
3 years, changed from −0.07 to −0.08).
Table 1. Meta-analyses of financial performance for acquired and acquiring firmsa
Acquired/acquiring
firms
Financial
performance
variable
Event
window
Estimated
population r
Number of
studies
Sample
size
Moderation
indicated
Acquired firms Abnormal returns Day 0 0.70∗∗∗ 33 5,060 Yes
Acquiring firms Abnormal returns Day 0 0.09∗∗∗ 127 28,016 Yes
Acquiring firms Abnormal returns Days 1–5 0.01 114 19,269 Yes
Acquiring firms Abnormal returns Days 6–21 −0.02 54 8,548 Yes
Acquiring firms Abnormal returns Days 22–180 −0.06∗∗∗ 64 5,698 Yes
Acquiring firms Abnormal returns >180 days–3 years −0.10∗∗∗ 103 25,205 Yes
Acquiring firms Abnormal returns >3 years −0.07∗∗∗ 26 5,966 Yes
Acquiring firms ROA 1 year −0.09∗∗∗ 9 1,960 Yes
Acquiring firms ROA 3 years 0.02 20 29,050 No
Acquiring firms ROE 1 year or longer −0.02 14 1,790 No
Acquiring firms ROS 1 year of longer −0.03 9 14,660 Yes
a Each row represents the results of separate meta-analysis.
∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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advanced to explain M&A activity (e.g., Hayward
and Hambrick, 1997; Kroll et al., 1997).
Moderation
When used in a regression analysis format, moder-
ation tests involve the use of multiplicative terms
to determine whether the marginal variances pro-
vide information beyond the individual elements.
The analog for this in meta-analysis is accom-
plished through establishing and comparing sub-
groups. Separate meta-analyses are conducted for
these subgroups and the population r estimated
for each subgroup. A critical ratio test then is
used to determine if the population rs are statisti-
cally different. Thus, the term ‘moderator’ is used
interchangeably with ‘subgroup’ in meta-analysis
literature.
There is evidence of potential moderation for
many of the event windows. Potential moderation
of an estimated r is indicated when the variability
in an effect size is larger than would be antici-
pated from sampling error alone, suggesting that
observed correlations do not estimate a common
population (e.g., Cooper, 1998; Lipsey and Wilson,
2001). Consider, for example, two meta-analytical
results. One has an estimated r near zero and very
little variance; the other also has an estimated r of
near zero, but with much larger variance. In the
first case, one would conclude that there is no evi-
dence of a relationship between the variables of
interest and there is no evidence of moderation. In
the second, we also conclude that there is no rela-
tionship, but there may be a moderating influence
on the relationship.8
One approach to determining the likely presence
of moderators is provided by Hunter and Schmidt
(1990), who suggest that the potential presence
of subgroups,9 or heterogeneity, is likely if the
8 Consider a simple case with four effect sizes: 0.02, 0.02, 0.00,
and −0.01. In this case the estimated r is very near zero and
there is very little variance. Another case has effect sizes of 0.4,
0.4, −0.4, and −0.4. Here again, the estimated r would be zero
(we will assume that the sample sizes for the effect sizes are
the same) and the variance is very high. In this case, one could
reasonably ask what is moderating this relationship. Why would
we observe high positive effect sizes in some studies and high
negative for others?
9 The interchangeable use of ‘subgroup’ and ‘moderator’ in meta-
analysis literature can lead to some confusion. A moderator is
often operationalized as a multiplicative variable. In a regres-
sion format, one determines if the multiplicative term provides
marginal explanatory power above that provided by its elements.
The analog for this in meta-analysis is accomplished through
sampling error accounts for less than 75 percent of
the observed variability. It has also been suggested
that 90 percent credibility intervals larger than
0.11 imply the presence of subgroups (Kowlowsky
and Sagie, 1993). To warrant a ‘Yes’ indication
in Table 1 for the ‘Moderation indicated’ column,
both of these guidelines must have been met. It
should be noted that sample variance does not
impact population value estimates, but has the
conservative impact of making significant results
less likely to be found (Griffiths et al., 1993).
Table 1 illustrates that the observed variance for
most of the estimated rs is greater than would be
anticipated from error alone. The M&A literature
provides a host of variables that have been sug-
gested to moderate post-acquisition financial per-
formance. Among those variables are whether the
acquisition was hostile, pre-merger performance
for both acquired and acquiring firms, acquisition
premium paid, horizontal/vertical merger, regu-
lated/unregulated, acquisition experience, method
of payment (cash/equity), related/unrelated, rela-
tive size of firms, complementary firm resources,
and whether the acquiring firm is a conglomer-
ate. As with the performance variables, we have
not selected a subset of these variables for testing
based on our preferences. Instead, we report those
variables on which extant studies have routinely
relied.10 Table 2 provides separate meta-analytical
results for abnormal returns for the four vari-
ables—conglomerate acquisitions, related acqui-
sitions, method of payment (cash vs. equity) for
acquisitions, and whether acquiring firms had prior
acquisition experience—examined in a sufficient
number of studies to allow cumulating results
using meta-analysis.11
With a single exception, the estimated popula-
tion correlations (rs) between the variables and
post-acquisition financial performance (abnormal
returns, as indicated) are not statistically signifi-
cant. The one statistically significant result is the
establishing subgroups. Separate meta-analyses are conducted
for the subgroups. An estimate of the population r is calculated
for each. Then, a critical ratio test is used to determine if the
population rs are statistically different.
10 To be included in the analyses, a given variable would have
to be included in a minimum of three samples (see Dalton
et al., 2003). In addition, the minimum of three effect sizes must
be derived from three independent studies. Information about
the same study population should contribute only once to the
summary estimate of an effect (e.g., Petitti, 2000).
11 All the studies included in the meta-analyses of the moderating
variables (Table 2) rely on studies relying entirely on samples
of U.S. firms.
Copyright  2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 25: 187–200 (2004)
194 D. R. King et al.
Ta
bl
e
2.
M
et
a-
an
al
ys
es
o
fp
ot
en
tia
lm
o
de
ra
tin
g
v
ar
ia
bl
es
a
A
cq
ui
re
d/
ac
qu
iri
ng
fir
m
s
Fi
na
nc
ia
l
de
pe
nd
en
t
v
ar
ia
bl
e
M
od
er
at
in
g
v
ar
ia
bl
e
Ev
en
t
w
in
do
w
Es
tim
at
ed
po
pu
la
tio
n
r
N
um
be
r
o
f
st
ud
ie
s
Sa
m
pl
e
siz
e
M
od
er
at
io
n
in
di
ca
te
d
A
cq
ui
rin
g
fir
m
s
A
bn
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
Co
ng
lo
m
er
at
es
D
ay
0
0.
07
8
71
3
N
o
A
cq
ui
rin
g
fir
m
s
A
bn
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
Co
ng
lo
m
er
at
es
1–
60
m
o
n
th
s
−0
.1
0∗
∗∗
14
32
22
N
o
A
cq
ui
rin
g
fir
m
s
A
bn
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
R
el
at
ed
ac
qu
isi
tio
ns
D
ay
0
0.
00
13
21
91
N
o
A
cq
ui
rin
g
fir
m
s
A
bn
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
R
el
at
ed
ac
qu
isi
tio
ns
1–
60
m
o
n
th
s
0.
05
6
45
5
N
o
A
cq
ui
rin
g
fir
m
s
A
bn
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
M
et
ho
d
o
fp
ay
m
en
t(
ca
sh
/e
qu
ity
)
D
ay
0
0.
01
22
31
18
N
o
A
cq
ui
rin
g
fir
m
s
A
bn
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
M
et
ho
d
o
fp
ay
m
en
t(
ca
sh
/e
qu
ity
)
1–
16
da
ys
−0
.0
1
24
42
07
N
o
A
cq
ui
rin
g
fir
m
s
A
bn
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
Pr
io
ra
cq
ui
sit
io
n
ex
pe
rie
nc
e
D
ay
0
0.
02
7
13
99
N
o
a
Ea
ch
ro
w
re
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
re
su
lts
o
fs
ep
ar
at
e
m
et
a-
an
al
ys
is.
∗
p
<
0.
05
;∗
∗
p
<
0.
01
;∗
∗∗
p
<
0.
00
1
Copyright  2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 25: 187–200 (2004)
Meta-analyses of Post-acquisition Performance 195
population r of −0.10 (p < 0.001) for conglom-
erate mergers with a 1- to 60-month event win-
dow. This suggests that conglomerate acquisitions
demonstrate negative abnormal returns over that
period. This result, however, does not demonstrate
that acquisitions by a conglomerate firm mod-
erate the level of abnormal returns. Notice that
results in Table 1 for event windows Days 22–180,
>180 days to 3 years, and >3 years are similar
to the conglomerate 1- to 60-month event win-
dow in terms of their estimated r values (r =
−0.08, −0.10, and −0.07, respectfully). This sug-
gests that conglomerate firms pursuing acquisi-
tions perform no differently than all firms pursuing
acquisitions under similar event windows.12 Thus,
while moderation is present in studies that have
explored the post-acquisition performance of con-
glomerates, the variable ‘conglomerate firms’ does
not capture this moderating effect. Rather, unob-
served variables within the pertinent study samples
account for the indicated moderating effect. Our
finding that method of payment does not impact
post-acquisition performance conflicts with Datta
et al. (1992). Our results, however, come from a
larger sample (1790 to 29,050 vs. 409 observa-
tions) and more than one post-acquisition event
window.
DISCUSSION
Meta-analysis is an effective means of establishing
the best estimate for a true population relation-
ship based on multiple studies. For our analyses,
the results are clear. Both acquired and acquir-
ing firms realize positive abnormal returns on the
day of an announcement (Day = 0). This suggests
the presence of an initial expectation that M&A
activity will create longer-term synergy. The Day
0 returns for acquired firms are extremely high
(r = 0.70), while the returns over the same period
for acquiring firms are much lower (r = 0.09). The
returns for acquiring firms in subsequent event
windows (Day 1 and later) are either insignifi-
cant or negative. This is true for separate meta-
analyses of both market returns (abnormal returns)
12 This can be formally demonstrated with a critical ratio test that
determines whether two estimated rs are, in fact, statistically
different. The critical ratio is a significance distribution with
essentially the same character as a z-score. In this case, the
critical ratio is 0.78. Accordingly, the abnormal returns for
conglomerate firms are not different from all firms over the same
event window.
and accounting returns (ROA, ROE, and ROS) and
indicates that expected synergies from the day of
a merger announcement are not subsequently real-
ized by acquiring firms. A clear implication of this
set of findings for acquired firm shareholders is that
they should take the windfalls typically afforded by
M&A announcements. That is, if given a choice,
investors with an equity stake in an acquired firm
should take cash for their investment. If equity is
received in lieu of cash, then investors in acquired
firms should cash out their holdings, because, on
average, continuing to hold equity in an acquiring
firm will lead to significantly negative abnormal
returns beginning 22 days after an acquisition is
announced.
Our results lead to a strong conclusion that the
true population relationship between the presence
of M&A activity and the performance of acquir-
ing firms is very near zero or negative beyond the
day a merger or acquisition is announced. Quite
simply, we find no evidence that acquisitions, on
average, improve the financial performance (e.g.,
abnormal returns or accounting performance) of
acquiring firms after the day completed acquisi-
tions are announced. Instead, we find that acquisi-
tions either have no significant effect or a modest
negative effect on an acquiring firm’s financial per-
formance in the post-announcement period. The
large number of studies, effect sizes, and total sam-
ple on which our analyses are based underscore
these conclusions.
Another methodological perspective that further
underscores the robustness of the current results,
consistent with Lykken’s (1968) classic formula-
tion, is that the included studies amount to an
extensive series of constructive replications. The
studies on which we relied for these meta-analyses
are essentially a series of samples drawn from a
discrete population, with replacement. Given the
range of sample sizes for our individual meta-
analyses (i.e., 1790 to 29,050 (see Table 1)), it is
certain that most of these firms have been repeat-
edly used to test propositions about M&A activity.
It is true, of course, that not all of the studies
repeatedly using these firms were identical in their
designs or in the specific variables of interest. Still,
the inferential logic that can be brought to bear
in an aggregation of these studies is extremely
robust.13
13 Our results are analogous to a non-parametric, chi-square test
based on a count showing that a preponderance of studies finds
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Thus, after decades of research the overwhelm-
ing conclusion must be that M&A activity, on
average, does not positively contribute to an ac-
quiring firm’s performance. This may lead one to
conclude, for example, that acquisition is not the
best means by which to access and profit from
valuable resources existing in other, external busi-
nesses. Research suggests, however, that alternate
modes of appropriating others’ valuable resources,
such as licensing and alliances, are also prob-
lematic (e.g., Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Olson,
1990; Pisano, 1990; Singh, 1997; Stringer, 2000;
Teece, 1986). Moreover, improving firm perfor-
mance through internal, organic growth has his-
torically proven to be a difficult challenge (see
Block and MacMillan, 1993). Thus, while acqui-
sitions may not have a strong and positive main
effect on firm financial performance, they may
be no more difficult to successfully execute than
other alternative strategies for business growth and
development. What is clearly needed is a bet-
ter understanding of the conditions under which
acquisitions make sense as a path to superior per-
formance. It is generally conceded, for example,
that acquisitions offer faster access to resources
than either internal development (Capron, 1999) or
alliances (Das and Teng, 1998), and greater control
than either licensing or alliances. The identification
of the factors in the acquisition context that result
in superior post-acquisition performance—i.e., the
moderators—is, however, another matter.
Ideally, the conditions under which acquisi-
tions will be associated with superior performance
would have been revealed in our meta-analyses.
Our results indicated that post-acquisition perfor-
mance is moderated, but by unspecified variables.
Unfortunately, when the impact of the four vari-
ables whose frequency in the literature allowed
for a closer examination was assessed, no signifi-
cant effects on post-acquisition performance were
found. Thus, existing empirical research has not
clearly and repeatedly identified those variables
that impact an acquiring firm’s performance. An
implication of the preceding major findings—i.e.,
that M&A activity does not improve firm perfor-
mance, and that no post-acquisition performance
effect exists for moderator variables that have been
repeatedly studied—is that changes to both M&A
an insignificant or negative impact of a merger on an acquiring
firm’s performance.
research methods and theory may be needed. Man-
agerial implications are also suggested.
Methodological implications
From the standpoint of research methods, three
areas of improvement are suggested based on our
study findings. First, most post-acquisition per-
formance research has only employed stock mar-
ket event studies, thus ignoring M&A effects on
other potentially relevant dimensions of firm per-
formance. The short-term nature of most event
studies may not fully capture anticipated benefits
from an acquisition due to information asymme-
tries (Barney, 1988; Hitt et al., 1998). The cur-
rent study, however, revealed that post-acquisition
performance effects are absent even under longer
event windows. Additionally, M&A effects on firm
financial performance were shown to be either
insignificant or negative when accounting mea-
sures of an acquiring firm’s financial performance
were examined. This may be a reflection of limita-
tions with accounting measures (see Chakravarthy,
1986) or the simple fact that not enough studies
have used accounting measures. For example, there
were not enough studies in the extant research
pool that included accounting measures to test the
impact of moderating variables on the performance
of acquiring firms. In short, multiple measures
of firm performance should be employed in post-
acquisition performance research in order to better
document the complete performance implications
of M&A activity.
Second, there is very little overlap across stud-
ies in the variables used to explain post-acquisition
performance. ‘New’ effects are characteristically
sought over replication of known effects, so knowl-
edge accumulation has been slower than might be
expected given the high level of research activity
in the M&A area. Importantly, because research
variables of demonstrated importance are regularly
excluded from M&A studies, underspecification of
research models (see Griffiths et al., 1993) may
represent the norm in M&A studies. Future M&A
researchers would be well advised to build on past
research models and not simply create new models.
Third, secondary data have been used to con-
struct the vast majority of variables examined
in M&A research as possible predictors of post-
acquisition performance. This leads one to wonder
whether data relevance has been sacrificed in favor
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of data availability in the creation of research mod-
els. The current meta-analysis failed to uncover
even a single moderator of post-acquisition perfor-
mance whose significant effect has been replicated
across the established minimum of three stud-
ies. Nonetheless, statistical tests of post-acquisition
performance variability strongly suggest that mod-
erating effects are present. Researchers simply may
not be looking at the ‘right’ set of variables as
predictors of post-acquisition performance.
Theoretical implications
Our research shows a clear need for further
model development to identify antecedents that can
help predict post-acquisition performance. Schol-
ars have recognized that no theoretical framework
currently explains the relationship between acqui-
sition antecedents and subsequent performance
(Hitt et al., 1998; Hoskisson et al., 1993; Sirower,
1997). Still, the wide variance surrounding the
association between M&A activity and subsequent
performance suggests that subgroups of firms do
experience significant, positive returns from such
activity. Existing models have failed to clearly
identify these subgroups.
Of the available options, complementary
resources may be a promising theoretical founda-
tion for continued M&A research, and is recog-
nized as an under-researched topic (Harrison et al.,
2001; King, Covin, and Hegarty, 2003). Comple-
mentary resources imply that a positive interac-
tion effect exists (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995)
between acquired and acquiring firm resources.
If increased post-acquisition performance requires
combining complementary acquired and acquir-
ing firm resources in new ways, then a multi-
plicative, or interaction, effect between acquired
and acquiring firm resources is implied. A multi-
plicative relationship between acquired and acquir-
ing firm resources could provide the framework
to explain synergy, or the concept that the sum
of merging two firms is greater than their indi-
vidual parts. Examining interactions also meets
an expressed need in M&A research (Hitt et al.,
1998; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990) and would allow
examination of post-acquisition performance rela-
tionships beyond current theories, founded largely
in finance, that typically focus on direct effects.
Although research on complementary resources
did not exist in quantities sufficient for the present
meta-analyses, both theory and initial empirical
results suggest that complementary resources may
help explain observed acquisition activity and pre-
dict post-acquisition performance (Barney, 1988;
Capron et al., 1998; Capron and Pistre, 2002; King
et al., 2003).
The failure of the current meta-analyses to reveal
any sustained positive effect of M&A activity
on post-acquisition performance also suggests that
nonfinancial motives may be under-represented in
theory and research that seek to explain M&A
activity. If M&A activity is motivated by factors
other than financial performance, it should not be
surprising that acquisitions on average do not lead
to higher financial performance. This is not to
suggest that we believe the evidence of acquisi-
tions not improving financial performance neces-
sarily results from managerial opportunism. If that
were the case, then increased reliance on corpo-
rate governance mechanisms over the past decades
should have led to a decrease in M&A activity,
not an increase. We suggest that alternate and less
menacing motivations, such as the use of acqui-
sitions to manage environmental or technological
uncertainties, or the pursuit of growth to decrease
organizational vulnerabilities, offer alternate, non-
financial motives for M&A activity. Additional
theorizing on nonfinancial motives for M&A activ-
ity is encouraged.
Managerial implications
Two primary managerial implications are sug-
gested by our findings. First, as a means
to reap the financial benefits often associated
with large firm size (e.g., economies of scale,
economies of scope), external growth through
M&A activity may be a highly speculative
undertaking with much less predictable results
than might be assumed. Given the difficulties
managers have traditionally faced in the pur-
suit of internal, organic growth (e.g., inadequate
innovation management processes, ‘newstream-
to-mainstream’ business integration difficulties),
external growth through M&A activity may seem
like an easy and obvious solution. After all, with
the acquisition of established companies, acquir-
ers effectively circumvent much of the challenge
and uncertainty surrounding the internal, organic
growth process. Not surprisingly, anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that external growth may be oper-
ating as a substitute for internal growth (see,
for example, Hitt et al., 1991; Stringer, 2000).
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Appropriating value from M&A activity, however,
presents its own set of challenges that may be no
less significant than those associated with inter-
nal growth. Until researchers can provide man-
agers better guidance on how value can be cre-
ated through M&A activity, the apparent bias for
external growth over internal growth likely will
continue to result in disappointing performance
outcomes.
Second, and related to the preceding point, man-
agers are advised to be as explicit as possible about
how, why, and where acquisitions can be rea-
sonably expected to strengthen their firms. Vague
rationalizations that go no farther than the com-
mon ‘synergy’ argument should be viewed with
skepticism. If managers cannot explain, in clear
and compelling terms, how acquisitions positively
serve the interests of their firms, those acquisitions
will not be consciously managed to best effect.
CONCLUSION
The typical effect of M&A activity on firm perfor-
mance has been well documented, and, on average,
M&A activity does not lead to superior finan-
cial performance. In fact, a stronger argument
can be made that M&A activity has a modest
negative effect on the long-term financial perfor-
mance of acquiring firms. Although M&A activity
has a demonstrated conditional effect on post-
acquisition financial performance, we find, after
cumulating results of extant research, the ‘con-
ditions’ most commonly studied in prior M&A
research (conglomerate acquisitions, related acqui-
sitions, method of payment [cash vs. equity], and
prior acquisition experience) do not impact post-
acquisition performance. Thus, despite decades of
research, what impacts the financial performance
of firms engaging in M&A activity remains largely
unexplained. This observation comes with the
caveat that the present examination is limited to a
subset of variables upon which extant studies have
routinely relied.14 Our findings could have two
distinct effects on the prospects for future M&A
research: they could be interpreted as evidence
14 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for identifying
the necessary caveat that interpretation of our results is limited
to studies and variables examined. However, the variables on
which we rely for our analyses do not reflect our preferences, but
rather those variables that consistently appear in extant empirical
research.
of the difficulty of research in this area, or they
could be interpreted as evidence of the significant
opportunities remaining for knowledge creation.
Given the high levels of observed M&A activity
and present indications of unidentified moderator
variables, we hope researchers embrace the latter
interpretation.
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